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POSTSENTENCE SENTENCING: DETERMINING 
PROBATION REVOCATION SANCTIONS 
BRADFORD C. MANK* 
Although procedural due process requirements govern 
the proof of a violation in a probation revocation hearing, 
judges exercise almost total discretion in deciding what 
sanctions to impose once a violation is established. l These 
postsentence judgments can be as important as the initial 
sentencing.2 Sanctions for even minor probation violations 
• B.A. 1983, Harvard College; J.D. 1987, Yale Law School; Clerk, Justice David M. 
Shea, Connecticut Supreme Court. The author thanks Joseph F. Hunnicutt for his 
assistance in preparing this Article for publication. 
1 The Supreme Court extended procedural due process requirements to revoca-
tion hearings in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
411 U.S. 778 (1973). See also Clarke, Probation and Parole in North Carolina: Revocation 
Procedure and Related Issues, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 5 (1977). Obviously, many pro-
bationers who appear in a revocation hearing are guilty ofa violation. For many, the 
issue is not whether they are guilty of a violation, but what sanction should be im-
posed. See infra note 5. This Article contends that the current procedural require-
ments are inadequate because judges exercise almost total discretion in deciding 
what sanctions to impose. Ajudge can punish a probationer for an unprovable viola-
tion by punishing him for a provable violation, and he can base the severity of the 
sanction on the unprovable violation. See infra note 21. It is clear that judges enjoy 
untrammeled discretion in determining probation revocation sanctions. 
While probation and parole decision makers are often given much discretion 
in selecting from among a substantial array of possible sanctions for a revo-
cation, few legislatures provide any significant guidance in making this deci-
sion. . . . Appeals from this decision are unlikely to succeed because 
appellate courts give great deference to the decisionmaker's judgment. 
N. COHEN &J. GOBERT, THE LAw OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 647 (1983). 
No article has specifically discussed the problem of how p'robation revocation sanc-
tions are determined. Some commentators have discussed in general terms the vast 
discretion judges enjoy in probation revocation hearings. See Clarke, What Is the Pur-
pose of Probation and Why Do We Revoke It?, 25 CRIME & DELlNQ.. 409 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter Purpose of Probation]; Dicerbo, When Should Probation Be Revoked?, in PROBATION, 
PAROLE & COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 448-58 (R. Carter & L. Wilkins 2d ed. 1976). 
These two articles contain interesting examples of the kind of problems judges face 
in deciding whether to revoke probation. However, they fail to separate the revoca-
tion decision from the choice of sanctions determination, and, most importantly, they 
do not put forward any comprehensive proposal about reforming the process by 
which judges make sanction judgments. 
2 Over a million Americans are now on probation, and inevitably many of these 
probationers will commit a violation. In 1982, 1,335,359 Americans were on proba-
tion. Broder, Use of Probation and Parole in the U. S., CRIM. JUST. NEWSL., Oct. 10, 1983, 
at 4. There are no comprehensive figures on the number of probation violations 
because different jurisdictions, localities, and even individual probation officers de-
fine differently what is a violation. Sometimes it is a conviction, an arrest, revocation 
followed by incarceration, or just a technical infraction of a probation condition. See 
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can range from obligating a probationer to meet with his 
probation officer more frequently to executing a suspended 
prison sentence. 3 The Supreme Court recognized in Morris-
sey v. Brewer 4 that the choice of sanctions is often more com-
plex than the proof of a violation. 5 Principles must be 
developed to regulate postsentence sentencing. 
Although judicial sentencing discretion and resulting sen-
tence disparities have been the subject of major reform ef-
forts, current sentencing reform movements have failed to 
understand that the determination of probation revocation 
sanctions is a major form of sentencing.6 Considerable dis-
parities may exist in how judges make sanction decisions; 
however, this question has received so little attention that 
the full extent of disparities is unknown. 7 This Article pro-
Boyd, An Examination of Probation, 20 CRIM. L.Q 355, 370-71 (1978). A recent study 
of 1,672 California felony probationers found that in over a forty month period two-
thirds of the probationers were arrested, and more than one-third had their proba-
tion revoked. J. PETERSILIA, S. TURNER, J. KAHAN & J. PETERSON, GRANTING FELONS 
PROBATION 20-26 (1985). While recent comprehensive statistics are lacking, it is clear 
that tens of thousands of probationers face revocation hearings and the loss of liberty 
each year. The question of determining probation revocation sanctions is of vital 
importance to the over one million on probation. 
3 Judges in probation revocation hearings can impose various sanctions. 
[T]he decision maker may be authorized to order anything from lenient to 
harsh sanctions. The former include dismissal of all charges, the issuance of 
a warning and rerelease, modification of the conditions followed by a rer-
elease on probation or parole, or altering the term of probation or parole. 
The latter includes incarceration. 
N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, supra note 1, at 646. Judges must retain a wide range of 
sanction options to fit individual circumstances. Also, they must improve the way 
they justify their sanction determinations to ensure that the sanctions imposed are 
mainly determined by the nature of the probationer's conduct rather than which 
judge happens to be conducting the revocation hearing. 
4 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
5 "Only if it is determined that the parolee did violate the conditions does the 
second question arise: should the parolee be recommitted to prison or should other 
steps be taken to protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation? The first 
step is relatively simple; the second is more complex." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479-80. 
This Article argues that courts have failed to establish adequate procedures to deal 
with the second or dispositional phase of the revocation hearing-what sanction 
should be imposed once a violation has been proven? 
6 Society'S concern with the problem of sentence disparity is reflected in the legis-
lative history of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
1837, 1987 (1984): "The shameful disparity in criminal sentences is a major flaw in 
the existing criminal justice system, and makes it clear that the system is ripe for 
reform." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 4, 65. The question of post sentence sentencing-i.e., the determina-
tion of probation revocation sanctions-has not been addressed. 
7 Because the problem of probation revocation sanctions has been largely ig-
nored, we do not have reliable data on what extent judicial discretion results in un-
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poses a procedure that would require judges to produce a 
written explanation of why they chose a particular sanction; 
such would help curb judicial discretion as well as create a 
badly needed body of knowledge about this area. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF PROBATION REVOCATION SANCTION 
DECISIONS 
Probation is often imposed in combination with a long 
prison sentence.S If a probationer commits a felony, it is 
often obvious that he must be incarcerated. When he com-
mits a misdemeanor or a technical violation, however, the 
determination of probation revocation sanctions becomes a 
problem; what sanction is imposed largely depends on 
which judge conducts the revocation hearing.9 
warranted postsentence sentencing disparities. Those observers who have touched 
on this issue have suggested that these disparities may be great. "just as disparities 
in sentence have been of concern to judges and probation officers, so are the dispari-
ties in the revocation of probation. The criteria for revoking probation are not uni-
form in district courts throughout the country and, at times, not even among judges 
in the same district court." Dicerbo, supra note I, at 448. "A constant problem in the 
revocation process, as in the sentencing process, is that of disparity, or inequity." L. 
CARNEY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: LEGAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 117 (1977). This 
Article will outline a set of procedures that will attempt to achieve two related goals. 
judges must be required to explain the reasoning behind their sanction decisions so 
appellate courts can curb the disparities. Not until appellate courts engage in mean-
ingful review of sanction decisions will there be a body of evidence showing to what 
extent disparities exist. The problem of judicial discretion in the determination of 
probation revocation sanctions is a serious one because revocation and incarceration 
can take place not only when the probationer commits a new criminal offense, but 
also when there is a technical violation. "A technical violation is distinguished ... by 
the fact that the supervisee is in contact with the officer but exhibits such problems as 
failure to report as directed, drinking and/or drug usage but refusing to undergo 
treatment, leaving a job and failure to support his family." A. SMITH & L. BERLIN, 
INTRODUCTION TO PROBATION AND PAROLE 129 (1976). judges have revoked proba-
tion and incarcerated a probationer because he failed to maintain regular employ-
ment. See, e.g., Bass v. State, 473 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v. 
Coffey, 74 N.C. App. 137,327 S.E.2d 606 (1985). In 1983 more federal probationers 
had their probation revoked for technical violations (3,021) than for misdemeanors 
(461) or felonies (1,562). SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICs-1984, at 
620 (T. Flanagan & M. McLeod ed. 1985). A recent study disclosed that forty-four 
percent of 34,600 parole revocations in ten large states were for technical violations. 
Study Finds Many in Prison/or Technical Parole Violations, CRIM. JUST. NEWSL.,jan. 16, 
1986, at 5. In some circumstances, it is necessary to incarcerate a probationer who 
commits a technical violation, but the dangers of judicial discretion are especially 
great when revocation occurs and sanctions are imposed for a technical violation. See 
infra note 9. 
8 See N. COHEN &J. GOBERT, supra note 1, at 654 (explaining the different ways a 
suspended prison sentence can be imposed in combination with probation and can 
be activated if probation is revoked). 
9 The discretion of judges and probation officers to revoke probation is especially 
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Probationers must fulfill a number of probation condi-
tions. These conditions are: (1) a general requirement that 
the probationer obey the law; (2) control conditions man-
dating that the probationer report to his probation officer; 
and (3) rehabilitative conditions such as maintaining em-
ployment, performing community service, or attending a 
drug treatment program. lO The violation of the second or 
third condition is a technical probation violation. Proof of a 
violation does not automatically justify revocation and incar-
ceration of the violator. II If the judge revokes probation, he 
has a wide range of sanctions from which to choose. 12 Ap-
pellate decisions and the legal literature provide almost no 
guidance concerning what probation revocation sanctions 
are warranted under a given set of circumstances. 13 Para-
doxically, judicial discretion is greatest in the case of minor 
violations. I4 For many probationers, the existing structure 
of due process protections in probation revocation hearings 
is irrelevant because the real issue is not whether they are 
guilty of a violation, but rather what sanction the judge will 
impose for that violation. IS 
great in the case of technical violations because great deference is given to judges to 
consider the probationer's overall rehabilitative progress. "While presumably it 
would be inappropriate for a field agent never to revoke, the whole thrust of the pro-
bation-parole movement is to keep men in the community, working with adjustment 
problems there, and using revocation only as a last resort when treatment has failed 
or is about to fail." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973) (quoting F. Rem-
ington, D. Newman, E. Kimball, M. Melli & H. Goldstein, Criminal Justice Adminis-
tration, Materials and Cases 910-11 (1969)). Judges and probation officers need 
some freedom to consider a probationer's overall rehabilitative progress but there 
must be some limits on that discretion to prevent abuses. 
to Judges have broad discretion to impose probation conditions, and only the 
most unreasonable ones will be overturned by appellate courts. See, e.g., United 
States v. Gracia, 755 F.2d 984, 991 (2d Cir. 1985). See generally N. COHEN & J. 
GOBERT, supra note I, at 18 1-343; Jaffee, Probation With a Flair: A Look at Some Out-of 
the-Ordinary Conditions, 43 FED. PROBATION 25, 25-36 (1979); Weissman, Constitutional 
Primer on Modern Probation Conditions, 8 NEW ENG. J. ON PRISON L. 367 (1982). 
11 "[Tlhe fact that a violation of a condition is a permissible basis for revocation 
does not support the idea that .revocation should necessarily or automatically follow 
the establishment of a violation." ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Standards Relating to Probation 58 (Approved Draft 1970) (emphasis in original). 
Too often commentators or courts have focused on whether revocation is constitu-
tionally valid rather than on what sanction is appropriate once a violation is proved. 
12 See supra note 3. 
13 See supra note 1. 
14 See supra note 7. 
15 See supra note 1. 
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A. Guilty Pleas and Probation Revocation Sanctions 
The problem of judicial discretion in determining proba-
tion sanctions is especially significant because most criminal 
convictions are obtained by guilty pleas. In a felony case in 
which the state may have difficulties winning a conviction, 
the prosecutor sometimes offers the accused a probation 
term in exchange for a guilty plea. 16 The accused may not 
worry about a suspended prison sentence imposed in addi-
tion to probation since the threat of going to prison seems 
remote at the time he accepts the plea bargain. 17 If, how-
ever, the accused commits a probation violation, he might 
actually serve a long prison sentence. 
Before the 1970s, most courts ruled that probation was an 
act of grace; it, therefore, could be revoked without any pro-
tection because the probationer was simply receiving the 
sentence the court could have imposed in the first place. In 
Morrissey, however, the Supreme Court finally extended min-
imal due process to revocation hearings. IS These minimal 
due process protections mean little if the judge in a revoca-
tion hearing can impose a sanction that is greatly dispropor-
tionate to the seriousness of the violation. 19 A clever 
prosecutor may occasionally offer a plea bargaining deal 
consisting of probation and a suspended prison term with 
the expectation that the accused probably will commit a pro-
bation violation and will likely be imprisoned sooner or 
16 In a plea bargain, a prosecutor offers a discounted sentence in exchange for a 
certain plea. A number of commentators have criticized plea bargaining on the. 
ground that it is unfair to trade away one's constitutional right to a jury trial in re-
sponse to an offer for a lower sentence. See, e.g., Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargain-
ing Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652 (1981). A case can be made in favor of plea 
bargaining on the ground that an adult should be able to choose a lesser sentence in 
favor of a jury trial if that is what the offender wants. Both the prosecutor and de-
fendant can benefit from avoiding the time and expense of a trial. See, e.g., Church, In 
Defense of "Bargain Justice", 13 LAw & SOC'y REV. 509 (1979). Church's arguments 
make sense only if the defendant is fully aware of the possible adverse consequences 
of a guilty plea. A person who pleads guilty in exchange for probation, but does not 
fully understand the revocation process, may not realize the substantial possibility of 
revocation, which would result in a long prison sentence. This is a concern even 
though the judge is required to explain that probation may be revoked if a proba-
tioner fails to comply with judicially imposed conditions. Few people who are not 
heavily involved with the criminal justice system understand that probation is often 
but a suspended prison sentence that can be activated even if the probationer does 
not commit another criminal offense. 
17 See supra note 16. 
18 See supra note l. 
19 See supra notes 1 & 7. 
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later. 20 
The existing system for determining probation revocation 
sanctions also allows judges in some circumstances to pun-
ish probationers for unproven violations. Judges can per-
form an end-run around the procedural due process 
requirements in probation revocation hearings by punishing 
a probationer far more severely than normal for a minor 
technical violation when it is impossible to prove a more se-
rious violation. 21 If the police and prosecutor cannot prove 
20 Some commentators have argued that prosecutors can influence the way proba-
tion or parole officers treat their clients. See McCleary, How Parole Officers Use Records, 
24 Soc. PROBS. 576, 587 (1977). There is at least the possibility that a prosecutor 
could convince a defendant to plead guilty in exchange for probation, and then pres-
sure the probation officer to report a violation so that probation will be revoked, and 
the offender will be incarcerated. See infra note 21. 
21 A judge can bypass all of the elaborate due process protections mandated in a 
revocation hearing. He can revoke probation and incarcerate a probationer over a 
minor violation when a more serious charge cannot be proved. A prosecutor may act 
in league with a probation officer without the judge'S knowledge to ensure that minor 
violations that are not ordinarily reported to the court by the officer are made a major 
issue. See supra note 20. 
Oftentimes probation officers proceed on the basis of technical violation 
when new criminal offenses are suspected but cannot be easily proved. Po-
lice and prosecutors regularly call upon the probation officer to invoke some 
technical violation against a probationer who they believe has committed a 
new crime. It is patently easier to put a defendant behind bars as a resuh of 
a probation violation hearing than it is to send him to prison as a result of a 
full-fledged trial. 
Czajkoski, Exposing the Qyasi-Judicial Role of the Probation Officer, in PROBATION, PAROLE, 
& COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 174 (R. Carter & L. Wilkins 2d ed. 1976). It is not nec-
essary to secure a conviction to revoke probation for a criminal violation. "The judge 
may revoke probation when reasonably satisfied that a state or federal law has been 
violated, and conviction is not essential." United States v. Guadarrama, 742 F.2d 
487, 489 (9th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). Several commentators have criticized 
the judges' ability to revoke probation based on unproven criminal conduct, or even 
after an acquittal. See, e.g., Note, Revocation of Conditional Libert)' Following an Acquittal: 
Collateral Estoppel Implications, NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT, Winter 1984, 
at 215. Whether the standards for revoking probation based on unproven criminal 
conduct are too low, it is still easier to revoke probation based on a technical viola-
tion. A prosecutor or probation officer may not be able to meet the standard of proof 
required to establish unproven criminal conduct even though evidentiary standards 
are much lower in a revocation hearing than a trial. Additionally, many jurisdictions 
require that the revocation hearing on unproven criminal conduct must follow the 
trial so that the probationer'S right against self-incrimination is not infringed; how-
ever, such a rule may delay the revocation hearing for months while a revocation 
hearing on a technical violation can take place immediately. Note, The Due Process 
Need for Postponement or Use Immunity in Probation Revocation Hearings Based on Criminal 
Charges, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1077, 1077-78 (1984). On the other hand, most probation-
ers constantly commit minor technical violations that are usually ignored, but which 
can serve as the basis for revocation and incarceration if probation officers and 
judges so desire. See, e.g .• Czajkoski. supra. at 174; Dicerbo, supra note 1, at 448-58; 
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that a probationer committed a new criminal offense, a 
judge may revoke probation and incarcerate the probationer 
over a technical violation that normally would not result in 
any major punishment.22 Procedural due process standards 
governing the proof of a probation violation in a revocation 
hearing are meaningless if the judge has the discretion to 
execute a suspended prison sentence even when the state 
cannot prove that the probationer committed a serious 
violation. 23 
II. SENTENCE GUIDELINES AND PROBATION REVOCATION 
SANCTIONS 
Sentence guidelines have been developed to restrain the 
discretionary authority of judges and to reduce sentence dis-
parities.24 The determination of probation revocation sanc-
tions is a form of sentencing.25 The creation of guidelines 
to regulate the imposition of such sanctions is a possibility 
that must be explored; however, the development of these 
guidelines is premature given our lack of knowledge about 
how judges currently make these decisions.26 Until we re-
quire judges to provide written explanations for their proba-
tion revocation sanction decisions, it will be impossible to 
formulate guidelines or to be certain whether guidelines 
would work in this context. These problems are explored 
below. 
A. Just Deserts, Guidelines, and Probation Revocation 
Many advocates of sentence guidelines stress a just 
deserts philosophy of punishment, which bases severity of 
punishment exclusively upon the seriousness of the crime 
and the offender's prior criminal record.27 This theory ex-
McCleary, supra note 20, at 576-87; Purpose of Probation, supra note I, at 412-13. Until 
the process for determining probation revocation sanctions is reformed, judges will 
be able to severely punish a probationer for a minor violation when a prosecutor or 
probation officer cannot prove a more serious violation. 
22 See supra note 21. 
23 See supra notes 3, 7 & 21. 
24 See supra note 6. 
25 See supra notes I, 3, 6, & 7. 
26 See infra note 83. 
27 One of the major advantages of sentence guidelines is that they reduce the 
judges' ability to consider individual rehabilitative factors in arriving at a sentence. 
Advocates of a just deserts theory of punishment would probably support sentence 
guidelines because they would desire to formally exclude rehabilitative, incapacita-
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eludes all rehabilitative criteria, although it is possible to 
construct guidelines that include both just deserts criteria 
and rehabilitative factors. 28 Two major questions arise in 
deciding whether guidelines are appropriate in the context 
of probation revocation sanctions. First, should these deci-
sions be made with a heavy emphasis on punishing the viola-
tor based on the seriousness of the violation, that is, a just 
deserts emphasis? Second, if just deserts theory should not 
be applied, are the sort of rehabilitative factors that are es-
sential in arriving at a probation revocation sanction deci-
sion the kind of rehabilitative criteria that are amenable to a 
guidelines approach? The answer to both questions is no, 
and guidelines are probably inappropriate in this type of 
sentencing. 
Ajust deserts theory of punishment should not be the pri-
mary basis upon which probation revocation sanctions are 
chosen. Important differences between initial sentencing 
decisions and probation revocation sanction judgments 
make the just deserts theory far less appropriate in the latter 
kind of sentencing. Once ajudge places a person on proba-
tion, the emphasis shifts from punishment to rehabilita-
tion;29 if punishment were the primary objective, then the 
tive, and deterrent criteria from sentencing decisions, and the best way to ensure 
judicial adherence to just deserts sentencing is to implement guidelines requiring 
such an approach. See, e.g., A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE, THE CHOICE OF PUNISH-
MENTS (1976); Frankel & Orland, Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 73 GEO. LJ. 
225, 226 (1984); Ozanne, Bringing the Rule of Law to Criminal Sentencing: Judicial Review, 
Sentencing Guidelines and a Policy of Just Deserts, 13 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 721 (1982). 
28 Minnesota, whose sentence guidelines are firmly rooted in a just deserts sen-
tencing philosophy, allows judges in misdemeanor and less serious felony cases to 
consider an offender's social circumstances and rehabilitative prospects when they 
decide to incarcerate him or to place him on probation. See, e.g., State v. Solomon, 
359 N.W.2d 19, 22 (Minn. 1984). Minnesota recognized that probation, unlike 
prison, contains an inherent rehabilitative element and, therefore, cannot be based 
on punishment alone. Id. just deserts theory is inapplicable to probation because, if 
the primary focus of the sentence was on punishment to the exclusion of rehabilita-
tive concerns, it would make more sense to incarcerate the offender rather than place 
him on probation. /d. Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Solomon acknowledged 
that "whether a defendant is particularly amenable to treatment in a probationary 
setting" must remain an essential factor in deciding whether to grant probation. Id. 
29 One of the major advantages of probation over prison is that it offers a more 
favorable environment for assisting the rehabilitative development of the offender. 
Some scholars have found that when comparable groups of offenders, in terms of 
their criminal history and certain social characteristics, are placed either on probation 
or in prison, those placed on probation have lower recidivism rates. See Babst & 
Mannering, Probation Versus Imprisonment for Similar Types of Offenders, 2 j. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQ.. 60 (1965) (two-year follow-up study of7,614 felony offenders in Wisconsin 
found that among first-time offenders, after controlling for criminal history and mari-
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judge would have incarcerated the offerider.30 Punishment 
concerns arise again if a probationer commits a new crimi-
nal offense, but the determination of what punishment is ap-
propriate should be left to a new criminal trial rather than to 
a probation revocation hearing that lacks the procedural 
safeguards mandated in a criminal tria1.31 If a probationer is 
tal status, probationers had lower recidivism rates, but second or multiple-time of-
fenders did not); Bartell & Winfree, Recidivist Impacts of Differential Sentencing Practices 
for Burglary Offenders, 15 CRIMINOLOGY 387,394 (1977) (controlled study of 100 New 
Mexico burglary offenders found that those placed on probation had lower recidi-
vism during a four-year follow-up study); Levin, Policy Evaluation and Recidivism, 6 LAw 
& SOC'Y REV. 17,24-25 (1971) (discussing a study by Beattie and Bridges involving 
4,709 California offenders that, after controlling for several variables, found that pro-
bationers had lower recidivism during a one year follow-up study); Parisi, A Taste of 
The Bars?, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109 (1981) (a study of "shock" probation 
which shows that at the very least probation can be as effective as prison in reducing 
recidivism among some groups of offenders). 
30 "These comments relating to parole apply with even greater force to probation, 
for the chances of successful rehabilitation are substantially greater for the offender 
who is granted probation .... " United States v. Reed, 573 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 
1978) (citation omitted). 
Many judicial opinions emphasize that probation offers a superior rehabilitative 
environment compared to imprisonment; also they provide that ajudge in a revoca-
tion hearing should consider the impact of revocation on the probationer's rehabili-
tative prospects. See supra notes 5 & 9. "The primary purpose of probation is to 
rehabilitate the offender. Therefore, the only factors which the trial judge should 
consider when deciding whether to grant probation are the appropriateness and at-
tainability of rehabilitation and the need to protect the public by imposing conditions 
which control the probationer's activities." Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 
897 (9th Cir. 1980). 
31 "If the probationer's violation is a new crime, it is illogical from a retributive 
point of view to impose additional punishment (imprisonment) for the original crime, 
which is not made any more reprehensible by the later crime." Purpose of Probation, 
supra note I, at 413. A probationer who commits a new criminal offense is more 
culpable because he has violated the trust of the court that granted him probation. 
There are two ways of examining the treatment of a criminal probation violation. 
First, the probationer could be punished more severely at the new trial because he 
has previously been given lenient treatment. Id. Second, his probationary status 
could be revoked because he has committed a criminal violation. This is simply acti-
vation of a suspended punishment for the previous conviction, which resulted in pro-
bation, plus a suspended prison sentence, not additional punishment for the new 
offense. In deciding whether to activate a suspended prison' sentence because of a 
probation violation, ajudge does not punish the probationer for the new offense; he 
determines whether the probationer can still benefit from probation, or whether his 
record is unsatisfactory in light of the public safety concerns raised by the violation. 
He also considers the probationer's rehabilitative progress because rehabilitation 
and public safety rather than punishment are the concerns of probation. "Our guide 
is the test set forth in United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, ... in which the court held that 
probation conditions must be reasonably related to rehabilitation of the offender and 
protection of the public." Higdon, 627 F.2d at 897 (citing United States v. Consuelo-
Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1975)). ':The primary purpose of proba-
tion ... is to promote the rehabilitation of the criminal by allowing him to integrate 
into society as a constructive individual, without being confined for the term of the 
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convicted of a felony, and a prison sentence is imposed for 
the new offense, then probation will be revoked automati-
cally. Ifhe receives a probationary term for the new offense, 
then the issue is not punishment; a separate probation revo-
cation hearing, however, may be held in addition to the new 
criminal trial to determine whether he is too dangerous to 
remain on probation.32 No matter how serious the alleged 
probation violation, a revocation hearing should never focus 
on punishment. Instead, the hearing should balance the 
public safety concerns raised by the seriousness of a viola-
tion against the extent to which the probationer has taken 
advantage of the rehabilitative opportunities offered by pro-
bation.33 Thus, just deserts guidelines are inappropriate for 
regulating probation revocation judgments. 
B. Rehabilitative Guidelines and Probation Revocation Sanctions 
It is possible to construct sentence guidelines that rely on 
rehabilitative criteria such as socioeconomic status.34 Pre-
dictive guidelines are also used by some parole boards.35 
Because institutional behavior is a poor predictor of post-
prison conduct, parole guidelines attempt to select the best 
sentence imposed." United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975). 
"These conditions serve a dual purpose in that they enhance the chance for rehabili-
tation while simultaneously affording society a measure of protection." /d. at 54-55. 
Just deserts theory is inapplicable to the determination of revocation sanctions be-
cause punishment should not be a factor in probation revocation. The primary con-
cerns are public safety and individual rehabilitation. 
32 See supra note 31. 
33/d. 
34 Ozanne, supra note 27. The author makes much of the fact that it is difficult to 
construct guidelines based on rehabilitative factors because it is necessary for judges 
to make a subjective evaluation of the offender's social background and rehabilitative 
prospects if there is going to be any reason to include rehabilitative criteria in the 
sentencing decision. This author partly agrees with Ozanne's argument that rehabili-
tative factors are too subjective and individualized to be reduced to guidelines form. 
Of course, the incompatibility of guidelines with the inclusion of rehabilitative crite-
ria may be an argument for not choosing guidelines if the individualized treatment of 
offenders is an important value. 
35 During the 1970s, the United States Parole Commission began using a set of 
predictive parole guidelines to decide which prisoners were suitable candidates for 
parole. Originally, the parole guidelines were based on factors including the of-
fender's employment status before conviction, his education prior to conviction, and 
his marital status. See Hoffman & Beck, Parole Decision-Making: A Salient Factor Score, 2 
J. CRIM. JUST. 195, 197-99 (1974). The use of socioeconomic criteria came under 
severe criticism. See infra note 37. Several years later the United States Parole Com-
mission dropped the educational and marriage factors from the guidelines. See Hoff-
man & Adelberg, The Salient Factor Score, A Nontechnical Overoiew, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 
1980, at 44, 47. 
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recidivism risks based on the prisoner's criminal record and 
his preconviction socioeconomic background.36 Such pre-
dictive guidelines have been heavily criticized because they 
are frequently inaccurate, and they often disfavor racial mi-
norities, who on average come from less affluent social back-
grounds than whites.37 Assuming these guidelines are of 
some value, however, their use is most appropriate when 
better information for predicting future behavior is unavail-
able. 38 Since judges in a probation revocation hearing are in 
a position to evaluate the violator's actual performance on 
probation, they need not rely on unreliable predictive 
guidelines based on general socioeconomic criteria.39 Use 
36 See, e.g., Carroll, Wiener, Coates, Galegher & Alibrio, Evaluation, Diagnosis, and 
Prediction in Parole Decision Making, 17 LAw & SOC'y REV. 199, 221 (1982) (prison con-
duct unrelated to known criminal conduct by released prisoners). 
37 Several commentators have argued against the use of socioeconomic criteria to 
predict recidivism in sentence or parole guidelines because such predictions are un-
reliable and disadvantageous to racial minorities. See, e.g. ,j. PETERSILIA & S. TURNER, 
GUIDELINE-BASED JUSTICE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR RACIAL MINORITIES (1985); Cof-
fee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability, and Equality in the Era of 
the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. LJ. 975, 1002-03, 1022-23 (1978). 
38 This Article maintains that there is a fundamental distinction between predic-
tion of an offender's rehabilitative potential based on his socioeconomic status before 
he was convicted and judicial evaluation of his performance while he is on probation. 
There are strong philosophical reasons for rejecting predictions in favor of re-
warding a person for his actual performance. 
The use of predictive criteria for selection is subject to challenge not only 
on grounds of accuracy, however, but also on the ground that it conflicts 
with other important social values, involving respect for individual auton-
omy. The attempt to predict an individual's behavior seems to reduce him 
to a predictable object rather than treating him as an autonomous per-
son .... To imprison a person because of crimes he is expected to commit 
denies him the opportunity to choose to avoid those crimes. 
Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball, Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Indi-
vidualized Judgment, 88 YALE LJ. 1408, 1414 (1979). It is important to examine the 
probationer's actual performance-on probation so those who perform well will be 
rewarded, and those who perform poorly will receive more severe sanctions if they 
commit the same probation violation. The overwhelming majority of probationers 
agree that they should be rewarded or punished according to their overall perform-
ance. This policy is attractive to society because it encourages probationers to be-
have well. See Allen, The Probationers Speak: Analysis of the Probationers' Experiences and 
Attitudes, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1985, at 67, 72 ("The probation system should pro-
vide incentives and rewards for compliance."). 
39 Statistical methods may be more accurate than clinical methods of evaluation, 
but sometimes the clinical method is preferred to keep a human element in the pro-
cess, which may aid in individual treatment. See Underwood, supra note 38, at 1420-
32. Probation is an area where encouraging the individual rehabilitative progress of 
offenders is essential, and therefore it is crucial that clinical methods be selected over 
statistical ones. 
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of such guidelines is, therefore, inappropriate in the context 
of probation revocation decisions. 
Guidelines are also inappropriate in this context because 
they do not mesh with the judge's task: balancing the public 
safety concerns raised by the violation against the violator's 
probation performance and rehabilitative needs.40 Tradi-
tionally, judges in probation revocation hearings have em-
ployed the clinical method of subjectively evaluating the 
probationer's probation performance and his rehabilitative 
progress and prospects.41 Guidelines are ill-suited to indi-
vidualized clinical evaluation.42 Because an individual pro-
bationer's rehabilitative progress and needs ought to be 
factors in determining sanctions, guidelines are unlikely to 
work in the context of probation revocation sanction deter-
minations. There are ways to improve the present system 
for making probation revocation judgments without adopt-
ing a guidelines approach. 
III. IMPROVING THE POSTSENTENCE SYSTEM 
The current probation revocation process could be im-
proved without detracting from the ability of judges to con-
sider the individual needs of each violator. One way to 
improve the process would be to require judges to provide 
written explanations of why a particular probation revoca-
tion sanction is most consistent with a violator's rehabilita-
tive needs.43 Moreover, both probation officers and 
appellate courts bear considerable responsibility for the ex-
isting deficiencies in probation revocation sanction deci-
sions,44 and an examination of their roles suggests 
additional ways to improve the process. 
A. Probation Officers and Discretion 
Probation officers exercise largely unreviewable discre-
tion, both in enforcing judicially imposed conditions and in 
deciding whether to report a violation.45 Another problem 
40 See Underwood, supra note 38, at 1414; supra notes 30-31; see also Allen, SIIpm 
note 38, at 67, 72. 
41 See supra notes 30-31. 
42 See Allen, supra note 38; Underwood, supra note 38. 
43 See infra notes 60-82. 
44 See infra notes 45-59 & 74-82. 
45 The United States Supreme Court has declared: 
Because the probation or parole officer's function is not so much to compel 
1988] PROBATION REVOCATION 449 
is the lack of uniform requirements about what sort of infor-
mation probation officers must report to the court regarding 
the probationer's general probation performance and his re-
habilitative needs when they report a violation.46 The pro-
bation reports submitted in revocation hearings are 
frequently inaccurate or incomplete,47 and one cannot as-
sume that counsel for a probationer in a revocation hearing 
will provide vital information about his client's rehabilitative 
development if the probation officer does not.48 As a result 
of these deficiencies, the judge may not have enough infor-
mation to impose an appropriate sanction. 
A new presentence investigation (PSI) should be prepared 
for every disputed probation revocation hearing; however, 
only a few jurisdictions now require PSIs.49 A new PSI is 
essential because a probationer's overall probation record 
should be evaluated, and many probation records are in-
complete.50 A neutral probation officer-not the one who 
conformance to a strict code of behavior as to supervise a course of rehabili-
tation, he has been entrusted traditionally with broad discretion to judge the 
progress of rehabilitation in individual cases, and has been armed with the 
power to recommend or even to declare revocation. 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 784 (1973). A number of commentators have 
discussed the broad discretionary powers exercised by probation and parole officers. 
See Cavender, Parole and Rehabilitation: The False Link, 5 NEW ENG. J. ON PRISON L. 1, 
15-16 (1978); McCleary, supra note 20, at 576-87; Robison & Takagi, The Parole Viola-
loras an Organiz.ational Reject, PROBATION, PAROLE, & COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 347-67 
(R. Carter & L. Wilkins 2d ed. 1976). Any reform scheme seeking to reduce discre-
tion and possible disparities within the probation revocation process must address 
the role of probation officers who control what violations are reported to courts. 
46 See infra notes 48-59. 
47 See N. COHEN &J. GOBERT, supra note 1, at 641 (inadequate probation records 
are commonplace); McCleary, supra note 20, at 587 (probation records cannot be 
trusted to be accurate). If judges are to make fair and equitable probation revocation 
sanction determinations, they need accurate information from probation officers. 
48 Even though no study explains how defense counsel act at probation revocation 
hearings, studies of how well defense counsel perform in the initial sentencing hear-
ing suggest that many fail to investigate their clients' social history and emphasize 
essential mitigating factors. Counsel rely on probation officers to conduct the 
presentence investigation (PSI), and often counsel do not ensure that PSIs are accu-
rate and as favorable as possible for their clients. See Dickey, The Law)'er alld the Accu-
racy of the Presmtmce Report, FED. PROBATION, June 1979, at 28, 38 (significant number 
of Wisconsin lawyers did not bother to read PSI). 
49 Some courts have required that a new PSI be prepared for a probation revoca-
tion hearing. See, e.g., People v. Crook, 123 Mich. App. 500, 333 N.W.2d 317 (1983); 
People v. Halaby, 77 A.D.2d 717, 430 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980). But see People v. Higgins, 
92 Ill. App. 3d 27, 416 N.E.2d 9 (1980) (new PSI is not necessary for a probation 
revocation hearing if there is an old PSI from the initial sentencing hearing; testi-
mony at the hearing served the purpose of a PSI). 
50 See supra note 48. One cannot trust defense counsel and probation reports to 
450 CUMBERLAND LA W REVIEW [Vol. 18:437 
reported the violation-should prepare the new PSI. Unfor-
tunately, in some jurisdictions, the same officer who reports 
the violation and testifies against the probationer can also 
prepare the probation report.5l The probation officer who 
reports a violation has a considerable stake in "winning" the 
revocation hearing, and he will often build a file full of unfa-
vorable probation reports before he reports a violation.52 
The Supreme Court has mandated that a neutral probation 
officer conduct the preliminary hearing before the final rev-
ocation hearing, and the same reasoning should apply to the 
preparation of the new presentence investigation. 53 
The probation revocation sanction process cannot be con-
sidered fair as long as probation officers exercise considera-
ble discretion in deciding whether to report a violation.54 
Obviously, disparities exist if two probationers commit ex-
actly the same violation, but their probation officer reports 
only one of the violators, and only one violator faces sanc-
tions. The discretion exercised by probation officers results 
from two sources. First, most judges are too busy to super-
vise probation officers.55 Second, probation and parole de-
partments indirectly encourage their officers to under-
report violations because they promote officers who have 
the most "successful" clients on paper.56 
provide all the essential information for a judge to make a proper probation revoca-
tion sanction decision. 
5l See People v. Peacock, 109 III. App. 3d 684, 440 N.E.2d 1260 (1982) (prepara-
tion of presentence report by same probation officer who initiated revocation pro-
ceedings and who testified at revocation hearing did not deny defendant impartial 
determination of her sentence). 
52 See McCleary, supra note 20, at 578. 
53 "The officer directly involved in making recommendations cannot always have 
complete objectivity in evaluating them." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 
(1972). 
54 See supra note 45. 
55 The prosecutor, defense auorney, and judge-in my experience-usually 
have liule interest in what happens in probation supervision. The case is 
seuled once the judgment is imposed, and they can move on to other cases. 
They give liule auention to seuing conditions of probation and prescribing 
the type of supervision the probationer is to receive because they expect the 
probation officer to take over at this point. 
Purpose of Probation, supra note I, at 411. Given time and money constraints, it is very 
unlikely that judges will ever have the inclination to undertake the arduous task of 
monitoring the work of probation officers. 
5(; Despite the job-related advantages of under reponing violations, if the parole 
officer dislikes a client, he may repon a violation that ordinarily would not be re-
poned. See Cavender, supra note 45, at 15-16; McCleary, sllpra note 20, at 576-87; 
Purpose of Probation, supra note I, at 412-13; Robison & Takagi, sllpra note 45, at 347-
67. There is danger that the existence of considerable discretion in the hands of 
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Attempts to curb the discretion judges exercise in deter-
mining probation revocation sanctions will have only a lim-
ited impact on the probation system unless there is an 
accompanying effort to police the discretionary powers held 
by probation officersY Judges are unlikely to undertake 
major responsibility for regulating the work of probation of-
ficers. 58 Probation and parole departments must change 
their institutional incentive structure by rewarding those of-
ficers who report the fullest possible information about the 
positive and negative behavior of their probationers.59 Pos-
sessing the fullest information possible will allow judges to 
make better probation revocation sanction judgments. 
B. Judges and Written Statement of Reasons 
There is an intermediate step between allowing judges to-
tal discretion to make sentence decisions and establishing 
sentence guidelines. Some jurisdictions require judges to 
issue a written statement of reasons to explain their initial 
sentencing decision.60 This requirement is a prerequisite to 
effective appellate review of sentences.61 However, this re-
quirement's effect on sentence disparities and moderation 
probation officers leads to unjust disparities in the probation revocation process. See 
supra notes 7 & 45. 
57 A major criticism of the sentence guidelines movement is that these guidelines 
simply shift the focus of discretion from judicial sentencing to the plea bargaining 
deals of prosecutors. See, e.g., Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 
733 (1980) (discussing ways to control prosecutorial discretion and the need to ac-
complish this goal if sentence guidelines controlling judicial discretion are to have 
meaning). 
It is far less clear in the context of probation revocation sanctions that efforts to 
curb judicial discretion would simply shift that discretion back to an earlier stage, i.e., 
to the reporting decisions of probation officers. 
58 See supra note 55. 
59 In plea bargaining, there are substantial cost savings associated with avoiding 
trials, and both sides gain a certain final outcome. See supra note 16. In parole and 
probation departments, there is a bureaucratic incentive structure that rewards of-
fices for having the best clients on paper. See supra notes 45 & 56. While these de-
partments have an understandable interest in looking good to the public and other 
actors in the criminal justice system, it is also likely these departments would respond 
to the demands of judges who wanted more information. See supra note 20. If judges 
were required to present a more elaborate written statement of reasons for their pro-
bation revocation sanction decisions, it is likely they would demand better informa-
tion from probation officers than is usually provided today. See supra notes 48-51. 
60 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115,377 A.2d 140 (1977) (citing a 
broad list of commentators and caselaw supporting a statement of reasons 
requirement). 
61 The importance of requiring a written statement of reasons to facilitate appel-
late review of sentence decisions is discussed in Riggins, 377 A.2d at 140. 
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of judicial discretion has varied according to how strictly ap-
pellate courts enforce this requirement.62 A system of writ-
ten statements of reasons justifying a sentence can be a 
viable alternative to sentence guidelines only if appellate 
courts reverse a significant number of sentence decisions 
and establish broad principles to help guide trial judges in 
making similar sentence decisions in the future. 63 This re-
quirement, combined with strict appellate enforcement, is 
the best means of regulating judicial discretion without un-
duly restricting how judges deal with the individual rehabili-
tative needs of probationers. 
There is authority for the proposition that courts must, 
consistent with constitutional due process, issue a written 
statement explaining a revocation decision. The Supreme 
Court in Morrissey mandated a "written statement by the 
62 The appellate review of sentences is an alternative to sentence guidelines. The 
successes of appellate review of sentences has varied according to how strictly appel-
late courts review sentence decisions and whether appellate courts have articulated 
broad principles to assist both trial and appellate courts in making future sentence 
decisions. See Labbe, Appellate Review of Sentences: Penology on the fudicial Doorstep, 68 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 122 (1977) (surveying the experience of the twenty-three 
states that had appellate review of sentences in 1977, and finding that the effective-
ness of appellate review ranged from worthless to moderately successful). Many 
states that had appellate review did not require a written statement of reasons from 
sentencing judges. It is not surprising to find that appellate review of sentence deci-
sions is perfunctory if trial judges are not obligated to explain the reason they chose a 
particular sentence. Some commentators have argued that appellate review of 
sentences can be an effective means of reducing sentence disparities. See, e.g., Erwin, 
Five Years of Sentence Review in Alaska, 5 V.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1975) Uustice of 
the Alaska Supreme Court praises Alaska's sentence review). But see Note, Sentence 
Review in Alaska, The Continuing Controversy, 6 V.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 129 (1977) 
(sentence review in Alaska has not lived up to its early promise because the Alaska 
Court has been too lenient in accepting the rationales of trial judges for sentences). 
The best way to sum up our experience on written statement of reasons and appellate 
review of sentences is that they have often failed to achieve the goals of reducing 
sentence disparities, but there is no inherent reason why they must fail. Given 
proper implementation, sentence review by appellate courts of written statements of 
reasons could be an effective alternative to sentence guidelines. See generally Zalman, 
Appellate Review of Sentences and the Antimony of Law Reform, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 1513 
(appellate review of sentences has generally not lived up to its potential, although its 
future cannot be discounted). This Article argues in favor of a written statement of 
reasons requirement and better appellate review of probation revocation sanction 
decisions because it is unlikely that courts will take the radical step of creating guide-
lines in this area until there is clear evidence of disparities. Such evidence will not be 
produced unless there are well-reasoned revocation and appellate decisions in this 
area. Sentence guidelines were not adopted until appellate review of sentences 
proved to be somewhat ineffectual, although it remains to be seen which of these two 
approaches is the best way of reducing sentence disparities. 
63 See supra notes 60-62. 
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fact-finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for re-
voking parole."64 While Morrissey's requirement addressed 
parole revocations, it has been applied to probation revoca-
tion decisions. Many courts, however, have interpreted 
l\1orrissey in different ways.65 Some have held that the re-
quirement of written findings in a probation revocation 
hearing can be met if the record of the hearing clearly shows 
evidence supporting proof of a violation.66 Others, how-
ever, demand that the trial judge produce a separate written 
statement of reasons justifying the probation revocation.67 
The extent of this required justification raises another 
problem. Appellate courts have been far more concerned 
with ensuring that trial judges establish a violation than with 
examining the justification for probation revocation.68 The 
reporting requirement will not improve the probation revo-
cation sanction process unless judges are obligated to ex-
plain why they chose a particular sanction in light of the 
probationer's rehabilitative history and needs and the public 
safety concerns raised by the violation.69 The Supreme 
Court, however, in Black v. Romano,'o argued that it would 
be extremely time consuming if judges were obligated to 
consider every possible alternative to incarceration in a writ-
ten statement before they revoked probation.7' Romano did 
not decide to what extent ajudge must justify the actual pro-
64 Monissey, 408 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added). 
65 See N. COHEN &J. GOBERT, supra note 1, at 643 (appellate courts disagree as to 
what extent a trial judge must justify a probation revocation decision in writing); infra 
notes 66-67. 
66 See, e.g., Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207 (lOth Cir. 1983) (the transcript ofa 
probation revocation hearing is enough to satisfy the written statement of reasons 
requirement in Monissey). But see infra note 67. 
67 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 767 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1985) (explicitly re-
jecting the reasoning in Morishita and requiring a separate written statement of rea-
sons justifying probation revocation in addition to the transcript of the hearing). 
68 Most appellate court decisions reviewing probation revocation judgments sim-
ply state that revocation is appropriate if there is sufficient evidence showing that the 
probationer committed violations; they do not discuss the sanctions issue. "Revoca-
tion of probation is appropriate if enough evidence exists for the District Court to 
conclude that the probationer failed to satisfy the conditions of his probation." 
United States v. Young, 756 F.2d 64,65 (8th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). Appellate 
courts must make a separate determination, after deciding that there is enough evi-
dence to justify revocation, of whether the sanctions chosen were appropriate in light 
of the probationer's rehabilitative needs and public safety concerns raised by the vio-
lation. See supra note 38. 
69 See s1lpra notes 30, 31 & 38. 
70 471 U.S. 606 (1985). 
71 Romano, 471 U.S. at 613. 
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bation revocation sanction chosen, but ruled only that a 
judge need not list in a written document every sanction al-
ternative he might have selected. The Ninth Circuit, on the 
other hand, has held that judges in probation revocation 
hearings are mandated by the due process clause to con-
sider mitigating circumstances before deciding that a viola-
tion warrants revocation. 72 Minimal due process should 
obligate a judge to explain why he chose a particular sanc-
tion in view of the public safety concerns implicated by the 
violation and the probationer's rehabilitative needs. 73 Such 
a written explanation could be quite effective without con-
sidering every possible alternative sanction. 
C. Appellate Review of Probation Revocation Sanctions 
As previously stated, a written reporting requirement is 
only useful when it is accompanied by effective appellate re-
view. 74 Appellate courts have rarely even considered the ap-
propriateness of a sanction once a violation has been 
established.75 A few courts have recognized that the "deci-
sion to revoke probation should not merely be a reflexive 
reaction to an accumulation of technical violations of the 
conditions imposed upon the offender."76 In Morrissey, the 
72 "Due process requires that a probationer at a revocation hearing he given the 
opportunity to show that mitigating circumstances suggest that the violation does not 
warrant revocation." United States v. Furguson, 624 F.2d 81, 83 (9th CiT. 1980) 
(citing United States v. Diaz-Burgos, 601 F.2d 983, 985-86 (9th Cir. 1979}). See Mor-
rissey, 408 U.S. at 488 (parole revocation hearing). It is necessary to go beyond a 
mere requirement that the probationer be allowed to present mitigating evidence. If 
a judge does not explain in writing how he balanced the mitigating evidence against 
the seriousness of the violation, then there is no way of ensuring any uniformity in 
the judge's decisions. 
73 See supra notes 30, 31 & 38. 
74 See supra notes 60-62. 
75 See supra note 68. 
76 United States v. Reed, 573 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 1978). The need for flexi-
bility in assessing the individual rehabilitative needs of offenders has been used to 
justify the discretion exercised by probation officers and judges in deciding whether 
to revoke probation. 
In practice, not every violation of parole conditions automatically leads to 
revocation. . . . [T]he parole officer ordinarily does not take steps to have 
parole revoked unless he thinks that the violations are serious and continu-
ing so as to indicate that the parolee is not adjusting properly and cannot be 
counted on to avoid anti-social activity. The broad discretion accorded the 
parole officer is also inherent in some of the quite vague conditions, such as 
the typical requirement that the parolee avoid 'undesirable' associations or 
correspondence. 
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479. Some discretion is essential if probation is to meet the 
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Supreme Court acknowledged that the determination of 
probation revocation sanctions is often far more complex 
than deciding whether a violation occurred. 77 Appellate 
courts must review these sanction judgments at least as care-
fully as they now examine the evidence proving a violation. 
There is at least one appellate decision that suggests how 
to review probation revocation sanction determinations. In 
United States v. Rodgers, 78 the Eighth Circuit upheld revoca-
tion, but vacated the sanction and remanded the case for 
resentencing. 79 The probationer in Rodgers failed to report a 
change in his address and employment, but otherwise had a 
model probation record.8o The trial court revoked proba-
tion and ordered him to serve two and one-half years in 
prison.8l The Eighth Circuit upheld revocation because a 
violation had occurred, but found the sanction to be exces-
individual rehabilitative needs of each probationer. The violation of the same proba-
tion condition, such as failing to attend alcohol therapy sessions, can be of varying 
consequences depending on personal rehabilitative needs. A larcenist may commit 
crime because he is an alcoholic; then, a judge should revoke probation if the alco-
holic larcenist refuses treatment. Here, the danger to society is substantial, and the 
probationer is failing to take advantage of rehabilitative opportunities that justified 
his probation. See A. SMITH & L. BERLIN, supra note 7, at 129-30. If ajudge imposes 
the same alcohol treatment condition on an alcoholic white-collar criminal, and the 
criminal activity was unrelated to drinking, and the violator at least tried to attend a 
few treatment sessions, a balancing of public safety and individual rehabilitative 
needs might lead to the conclusion that the appropriate sanction should be better 
counseling and renewed attempts at alcohol treatment. See Purpose of Probation, supra 
note 1, at 14-16. It is impossible to completely eliminate the subjective element in 
rehabilitative evaluations. See supra notes 30-34. The admission that some discretion 
must remain in the process of determining probation revocation and sanctions does 
not mean that there should be no controls on that discretion. A written explanation 
is not inconsistent with judicial discretion; it merely provides an appellate court 
grounds for reversal for abuse of discretion. There is already an abuse of discretion 
standard for appellate review of probation revocation decisions. See, e.g., United 
States v. Young, 756 F.2d 64, 65 (8th Cir. 1985). The problem is that almost all 
appellate court decisions have simply looked at whether there was enough evidence 
that there had been violations of conditions to warrant probation revocation. See id. 
Most appellate court decisions reviewing probation revocation judgments have failed 
to examine what sanctions are appropriate once a violation is proved. See supra notes 
I & 3. 
77 See supra note 5. 
78 588 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1978). 
79 Id. at 651-54. 
80 /d. at 652-53. The Eighth Circuit emphasized that Rodgers' failure to report 
posed no danger to the public, and that Rodgers had remained living in the same city 
when he failed to report a change of address so there was no attempt to flee proba-
tion supervision. 
81 Id. at 653. The trial judge imposed the maximum possible sanction-the full 
length of the suspended prison sentence. 
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sive.82 Appellate courts must follow the example of the Rod-
gers. court and treat the sanction issue as a separate item for 
reVIew. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article advocates an intermediate approach to re-
forming the probation revocation sanction process. It is 
premature to implement guidelines because we do not know 
enough about how judges make these decisions. Judges 
clearly exercise great discretion in determining probation 
revocation sanctions, but we do not know the extent to 
which unwarranted disparities exist.83 Until we understand 
this process better, judges should retain their traditional 
power to subjectively evaluate the rehabilitative needs of 
probationers in these hearings.84 A reporting procedure 
82 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in their per curiam opinion: 
Appellant, except for the reporting requirements previously discussed, fully 
complied with the conditions of his original semence. He had committed no 
new crimes, had been employed almost continuously during his un-
supervised period of probation under his own name, and continued to re-
side in Little Rock, albeit at a new and undisclosed address. Under these 
circumstances we are concerned with the district court's failure to indicate 
why a lesser penalty was not considered. 
[d. at 654. The Rodgers court upheld the revocation, but vacated and remanded the 
case for resentencing. "We suggest that the district court may desire to consider 
suspending the sentence imposed in whole or in part and place appellant on proba-
tion for an appropriate period." [d. 
The decision that there is enough evidence of a violation to warram revocation 
should not be the end of an appellate court's review of a probation revocation deci-
sion. A separate examination should be made of the appropriateness of the revoca-
tion sanction chosen. To facilitate appellate review of sanction decisions, trial judges 
should be required to submit a written explanation of why they chose that particular 
sanction. See supra notes 30-34. The Supreme Court in Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 
606 (19~5), rejected the contention that the due process clause requires ajudge in a 
probation revocation hearing to explore in writing every possible alternative to incar-
ceration. The Rodgers court found that the trial court chose an excessive sanction 
without exploring every possible alternative. It is possible to require explanation and 
justification from trial judges and appellate courts without adopting the "all possible 
sanctions examination" approach that was rejected by the Supreme Court in Black v. 
Romano. 
83 One possible objection to the procedures proposed in this Article is that no 
changes should be made in the process of determining probation revocation sanc-
tions until there is more substamial evidence that widespread disparities exist. We 
will never know the full extent of disparities unless we require judges to explain their 
reasoning process in the record; without this requiremem, there can be no effective 
appellate review of probation sanction decisions. The tremendous discretion exer-
cised by probation officers and trial judges in the probation revocation process may 
cause substamial disparities. See supra note 7. 
84 Although reform is needed to ensure effective appellate review, it would be 
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would better the existing system without radically changing 
it. Requiring better written statements of reasons and more 
thorough appellate review would generate a new body of 
knowledge about this area that would help us decide 
whether further reforms are necessary. 
dangerous to impose a radical method of determining sanctions such as ajust deserts 
guidelines approach because we know so little about how judges make decisions 
under a certain set of circumstances. Moreover. what we know about the probation 
revocation process suggests that judges need to retain some discretion to take into 
account the individual rehabilitative needs of violators. Society can always adopt 
more radical reform measures if these moderate reforms are not enough; however. 
adopting a guidelines approach in this area is premature. 

